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1Chapter 1
CROATIAN ACCESSION TO THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: THE CHALLENGES 
OF PARTICIPATION
Katarina Ott*
Institute of Public Finance
Zagreb
ABSTRACT
This chapter summarizes the findings of the project of monitor-
ing Croatian accession to the European Union. It draws particular at-
tention to the challenges entailed in participation in the accession pro-
cess and in relations with European countries, irrespective of Croatia’s 
membership status. It tries to answer questions about: the place of Cro-
atia in Europe; the problems of its economy; the nature of its political 
elite and the views of its citizens, and institutions’ capacities to adapt 
to requirements of modern and open societies. Among the findings one 
could highlight: First, irrespective of the membership status, there are 
possibilities for Croatia to participate and even to try to act as lead-
er in some fields (e.g. Adriatic Sea protection) and Croatian experts 
could participate in and contribute to the discussions of EU-relevant 
topics (e.g. European citizenship or communicating Europe). Second, 
high and stable distrust in the EU, rising unwillingness to join the EU 
and views concerning the EU that are more based on impressions than 
on utilitarian considerations might lead to a Croatian “no” to the EU in 
the final moment of decision. However, if the benefits of reforms are 
reaped even without joining the EU, this does not have to be a disas-
ter for the country, although it could be a serious setback for the politi-
cal elite. Third, adaptation of the capabilities of Croatian institutions is 
despite many improvements still the weakest spot. The progress of re-
2forms has been limited and characterized by partiality, lack of strategies 
and still under strong political influences. The key words missing in al-
most all investigated fields are implementation, enforcement and action 
plans. As the end of negotiations will more depend on the implementa-
tion than on the mere adoption of EU requirements, Croatia should turn 
to an “as soon as ready” instead of an “as soon as possible” policy. 
Key words:
European Union, Croatia, accession, reforms, administrative capacity, 
legal enforcement
INTRODUCTION
This chapter summarises the findings of the project of monitor-
ing Croatian accession to the EU. It draws particular emphasis to the 
challenges entailed in participation in the EU accession process and in 
relations with European countries, irrespective of Croatia’s member-
ship status. It identifies the ideas of the project, gives a brief chronol-
ogy of the relationship between the EU and Croatia, presents changes 
in Croatia in last couple of years, details the challenges of participation 
and ends with some conclusions and recommendations.
The idea of the 2006 project was to try to answer questions for 
Croatia similar to those that citizens of France asked themselves before 
the EU constitution referendum: about the place of the country in Eu-
rope, particularly vis-à-vis the EU and vis-à-vis the West Balkan; about 
the problems of the economy, particularly in its efforts to create more 
jobs, and about the nature of the political elite. To these three questions 
we added one about the capabilities of Croatian institutions to adapt to 
the requirements of modern and open societies. 
Several or almost all the chapters try to answer the question 
about the place of Croatia in Europe, comparing its data, policies and 
institutions with those of EU members, other candidates and West Bal-
kan countries. The results are diverse from high rankings in measure-
ments of perceptions of wellbeing and happiness to huge differences 
in state aid as a share of GDP. Probably the most obvious problem en-
countered in almost all the investigated fields is the lack of reliable sta-
tistical data. This indicates the necessity of developing a system of col-
lecting and monitoring qualitative and quantitative indicators to en-
able reliable comparisons with other countries. Comparing the Croa-
3tian speed of entry into the EU and the experiences of new members 
one could conclude that capacity to meet the tight timetable and to draft 
qualitative reform could lead to poor quality of legislation, insufficient 
policy analysis, government overload and counterproductive results. 
However, the chapter on the needs for regional cooperation in protect-
ing the Adriatic Sea shows how Croatia could also act as a leader in 
proposing joint actions for several EU member and non-member coun-
tries. The chapter on European citizenship and the chapter about com-
municating Europe in which authors from Croatia, not yet the member 
of the EU, approach topics relevant for the development of EU con-
cepts and practices show that Croatian authors could also contribute to 
EU discussions. 
The problems of the economy are dealt with in a chapter on the 
Lisbon Strategy, state aid reform and health care policy and reform. 
Topics posing problems for the most developed countries are even 
more pronounced in Croatia. Goals are difficult to achieve, but could 
be used as benchmarks and for learning from the best performers. The 
main economic problems lie in the slow reforms and privatization pro-
cesses with high involvement of the state in the economy, inadequate 
education, administrative and managerial capabilities. Problems can be 
easily observed in high foreign and public debt, slow results in increas-
ing employment and poor results in decreasing public expenditures.
Instead of dealing with the nature of the political elite, which is 
partly dealt with in the chapter on lobbying and interest groups and that 
on negotiation experience, authors were more oriented to the attitudes 
of the ordinary citizen. One can find them in chapters on quality of life, 
life satisfaction and happiness; euroscepticism, and the determinants of 
the support of citizens for the EU. The results show a rather high and 
stable distrust of the EU, rising unwillingness to join the EU, views to-
ward the EU that are formed more on the basis of impressions than of 
utilitarian considerations, and dissatisfaction with the standard of living 
and social conditions. The political elite should be aware of the attitudes 
of population to avoid unpleasant surprises at the moment of the final 
decision on joining the EU. If the benefits of reforms can be reaped 
even without joining the EU, a Croatian “no” for the EU does not have 
to be a disaster for the country, but it could be a serious setback for the 
political elite. The findings of the authors, particularly concerning the 
dissatisfaction with the standard of living and with social conditions, 
are also connected with economic problems. Implementation of struc-
tural reforms aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the economy, 
4restructuring of social services and improving governance will be nec-
essary to create the conditions for utilitarian assessments. 
The capabilities of institutions to adapt to the requirements of 
modern and open societies – probably dealt with in almost all chapters 
– are, despite many developments in good directions, still the weakest 
spot. Almost all authors engaged in this project emphasize the limited 
progress of reforms, which continue to be made only partially, without 
strategies and under strong political influences. Normative versus real 
conformity with EU requirements, poor implementation and enforce-
ment, lack of action plans or implementation instruments with clear 
obligations, deadlines and reporting systems, poor administrative and 
managerial capacities, poor leadership qualities, high politicization… 
One can hardly stop enumerating the problems. As it is obvious that 
the end of negotiations will depend more on the implementation than 
on mere adoption of EU requirements, as was the case in the last en-
largement, one of the authors simply concluded that Croatia should try 
to turn to an “as soon as ready” instead of an “as soon as possible” 
policy. 
Box 1 Brief overview of European Union Monitoring Project
It all started in 2002 at the initiative and with the ﬁnancial
support of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung ofﬁce in Zagreb. The ﬁrst book
(Ott, 2003) dealt with economic and legal challenges. Major pro-
blems found were related to education, public administration, nor-
mative vs. real conformity with the EU, building of efﬁcient institu-
tions and a society that respects laws and individual rights. 
Awareness of such problems led to the second book (Ott, 
2004) dealing with institutional challenges. We stressed that dea-
ling with institutions was not only fashionable, but also important 
for both the economy and the society, as institutions could inﬂuence
development, growth and democratization. We said that adjustments 
were often just normative, bureaucracy was ﬂourishing and laws
were often poorly harmonized and deﬁcient. The key issues with or
without the accession would be: better and faster application of ru-
les and institutions; quality and depoliticisation of the public admi-
nistration, particularly the judiciary and institutions for deregulation 
and liberalization of markets. 
As we believed that we were nearing the negotiations, our 
third book (Ott, 2005) dealt with the challenges of negotiations. We 
stressed that Croatia’s future could depend on overall preparedness 
and credibility not only regarding the sole person missing as it see-
5med then; developments in Bulgaria and/or Romania; EU attitudes 
towards Turkey and fatigue of the EU with the last enlargement. 
We suggested that accession should be used as the process of tran-
sformation of the country. We said that a kind of real integration of 
Croatia in the European space already existed even without the for-
mal accession and that it should be further deepened through the 
building of institutions and harmonization with modern, democra-
tic societies. We also warned that despite the declarative dedicati-
on of Croatian government to join the EU as soon as possible, and 
despite the encouraging signals from the EU, hesitations in structu-
ral and institutional reforms could hamper not only the success of 
negotiations and delay the accession, but also hamper the transfor-
mation of the country into a modern, efﬁcient and democratic sta-
te. Unfortunately, some of the views proved to be correct before we 
even managed to publish the book, when the EU postponed the start 
of negotiations. 
Before planning this fourth book (Ott, 2006) we somehow 
started hoping that the future EU could probably go more in the di-
rection of a looser, less federalist and more decentralized club than 
an ever-tighter Union. We also started hoping that the current mem-
bers would opt for a stronger subsidiarity principle. Member coun-
tries would in that case be able to take different approaches tow-
ards the issues that would not substantially harm the principles of 
the free ﬂow of services, goods, labour and capital. If this were so,
such an EU could seem more appealing to a small country like Cro-
atia, which could certainly beneﬁt from participating in a common
market, but could hardly substantially participate in governing the 
Union. 
CHRONOLOGY OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN CROATIA AND EUROPEAN UNION
Due to the war Croatia experienced in the early 1990s and its po-
litical, institutional and economic consequences in the following years, 
country lagged behind other Central and Eastern European (CEE) coun-
tries in its relationship with the EU. The Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA) was signed in 2001, Croatia applied for EU mem-
bership in 2003 and after numerous ups and downs in the relationship, 
mostly caused by the clumsy cooperation with the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), accession negotiations 
6and the screening stage of the accession negotiations started in Octo-
ber 2005. Less than a year after that, Croatian negotiators were busy 
and quite advanced with chapters on science and research and on ed-
ucation and culture, which were opened and provisionally closed. All 
other chapters also went through various stages of multilateral and bi-
lateral screening to fulfilling the requirements for opening the chapters 
according to the report from the Commission. The most difficult ones 
were chapters on regional policy and coordination of structural instru-
ments, judiciary and fundamental rights, foreign security and defence 
policy and finally finance and budgetary provisions that did not even 
start the first explanatory stage of the screening. 
It is true that some chapters are more complicated than others. 
It is also true that Croatia’s intentions are to close the chapters faster 
than any of the previous candidates. This intention is fuelled first by the 
high expectations of the population and second by the logical conclu-
sion that country could learn from the experiences of the previous can-
didates. However, as things in Croatia are changing rather slowly, we 
could remind ourselves of the conclusions of the Progress Report of 
the European Commission (2005). After praising the positive achieve-
ment of Croatia in the previous period, Commission stated that “fiscal 
consolidation needs to be further strengthened and effectively backed 
by structural measures, in particular in the area of subsidies and social 
transfers… there are complex rules and deficiencies in public adminis-
tration and courts as well as slow market entry and exit procedures. The 
enforcement of property and creditor rights continues to be undermined 
by an inefficient judiciary. State interventions in the economy remain 
significant and little progress has been made with respect to the restruc-
turing of large state-owned enterprises in particular in the shipbuild-
ing, steel and energy sector. The strengthening of financial discipline of 
state-owned enterprises remains a particular policy challenge… Croa-
tia needs to address the identified weaknesses and problems with deter-
mination”. 
These statements could be seen as guidelines for the majority 
of the authors engaged in this project, leading them to approaches they 
deemed particularly important and interesting. 
7CHANGES IN CROATIA IN  
THE LAST COUPLE OF YEARSi
Economic sustainability
The briefest facts about the developments in the Croatian econ-
omy could be summarized in following way:
•  Economic growth is favourable (a 3.8% rise of GDP in 2004, 4.3% 
in 2005 and 6.0% in 2006/Q1) with predictions of 4.4% for 2006 and 
4.5% for 2007.
•  Inflation is accelerating from 2.1% in 2004 to 3.6% in 2006/Jan-Jul. 
and is expected to stay at similar levels in 2006 and 2007.
•  The current account deficit is growing (4.9% GDP in 2004, 6.3% in 
2005 and 6.5% in 2006/Q1) with unfavourable predictions (around 
6% in 2006 and 2007).
•  Foreign debt is increasing (80.2% GDP in 2004, 82.5% in 2005 and 
87.9% in 2006/Q1) although it is expected to decrease to 81.5% in 
2006.
•  Total public debt is slightly increasing (46.4% GDP in 2004, 47.4% 
in 2005 and 47.8% in 2006/Q1) although expected to decrease to 
around 44% in 2006 and 2007.
•  General government budget deficit is showing better results (4.6% 
GDP in 2004, 3.4% in 2005 and 2.9% in 2006/Q1) although expected 
to be around 3.5% in 2006 and 2007.
•  Tax burden (41.4% in 2004) is slightly but constantly decreasing and 
coming closer to EU averages, although the structure of taxation sub-
stantially differs (indirect taxes are over 50% of total tax revenues in 
Croatia vs. less than 40% in the EU-25 average).
•  Employment growth continues (around 1% per year), and the unem-
ployment rate fell to under 13%. 
We could say that macroeconomic trends are generally favour-
able: above average GDP growth, rising employment, decreasing gen-
eral government budget deficit, moderate growth of salaries, and slight 
appreciation of domestic currency. However, inflation, although not 
alarming, is accelerating. Current account deficit and foreign and pub-
lic debt are growing, ranking Croatia among highly indebted countries. 
Policymakers should have in mind that countries like Croatia should 
aim for much lower public debt targets than those envisaged by the 
Maastricht criteria (20-40% instead of 60% GDP). 
8Thanks to the decreased budget deficit fiscal policy could be 
evaluated positively. However, one could still be puzzled about the 
pension debt payments bookkeeping and cautious because the positive 
signs are resulting from revenue increase without any serious results 
on the expenditure side of the budget. Slow dynamics, poor results and 
scandals in privatization process are certainly not contributing to the 
improvement of the fiscal position of the country. 
Despite the still high levels of unemployment and despite the 
realistic expectations that the EU will ask for a transition period for 
workers from Croatia, the government could start thinking in advance 
and aiming for a liberalisation of the labour market. Free movement 
of workers benefits countries that have liberalized that market. It has 
helped to remedy labour market deficiencies, open new jobs, decrease 
unemployment and increase economic growth. Only two percent of the 
EU active population lives and works in other member states and the 
movement of workers is still slow. That is the reason why an addition-
al number of old member states lately further liberalised their labour 
markets. The Croatian government approved 2,600 foreign workers in 
2004 and only 1,037 in 2006 although the needs for foreign workers are 
substantially higher. The realistic number of them already working in 
Croatia could be over 10,000. They are mostly working in shipbuild-
ing, construction and tourism and come from Bulgaria, Romania, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, Slovakia and Ukraine. Liberalisation of the la-
bour market could help to bring down the unofficial economy, corrup-
tion and criminal activities, give incentives to better quality growth of 
the economy, and remedy the mismatch of labour supply and demand 
at the same time as enabling more humane conditions for the increasing 
number of illegal foreign workers. 
Administrative capacities
Changes in the public administration in the last couple of years 
show limited progress in the application of reforms that continue to be 
made partially, without strategies and under strong political influences. 
While the European Commission in 2004 said that initial steps should 
be taken, in 2005 it required complete enforcement of reform mea-
sures. Although no results in administrative capacities building can be 
seen in the short run, changes of laws about government administration 
and changes in the number and scope of ministries and various offices 
and agencies would tend to suggest that they were not driven by ratio-
9nalizations, the incentives being found rather in combining the avail-
able manpower resources in the most effective and politically reward-
ing ways. The way in which the public administration is formed, the 
transparency of its work and respect for access to information are cru-
cial, particularly in the fight against corruption. However, we are still 
in want of definitions of bodies of the public administration, of a list of 
government officials and of the information that has to be accessible 
to the public. Strategy of the reform is still in preparation, which could 
go some way to explaining the partiality of reforms. The adopted Stra-
tegic Framework for 2006-13 (Vlada RH, 2006) defines some of the 
goals necessary for public administration reform and various new in-
centives are proposed, but it is difficult to expect the necessary politi-
cal will for their implementation in the second part of the government 
term in office. 
As a case study for administrative capacity building one could 
go deeper into the energy sector. The reform of that sector has not been 
efficient. Delays in enforcement and the necessity of further harmoni-
sation with EU requirements are stated as formal reasons for passing 
new laws. Croatia accepted the obligations of the energy sector acquis 
and the parts related to market competition, state aid, environment pro-
tection and regional cooperation in that sector, but enforcement is still 
a challenge. Some improvements are visible, but among the numerous 
further requirements of the Commission in that field, one should again 
emphasize overall improvement of administrative capacity for enforce-
ment of laws. New laws formally represent a step forward, but enforce-
ment is still problematic because of the insufficient preparations, weak 
administrative structure, legal insecurity and strong lobbying. Deficien-
cies are visible in the unreliability of data, which shows up the weak-
nesses of the controlling ministry; in lack of funding for newly estab-
lished administrative structures, which endangers their independence; 
and in frequent changes of laws raising expectations of further lobby-
generated modifications. 
The capability of Croatia to use EU regional policies funds 
shows similar weaknesses. Regional policy is segmented, regulated by 
various laws, without a strategy for regional development. Numerous 
proposals of laws and strategies exist, some important steps have been 
taken, but real documents for enforcement are lacking. All levels of 
government in Croatia should be aware that the EU can finance our 
projects but only if we also engage our funds and plan them in advance. 
That will be impossible without the enforcement of strategies, laws and 
regulations. 
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The situation in justice, welfare and civil society 
The relationship of Croatia and the EU is developing, and nor-
mative harmonization is in full gear. However, normative analyses of 
the preparedness of a country can not give a complete picture. Harmon-
isation should be looked upon together with basic requirements of rule 
of law like the division of power, democracy, political pluralism and 
independence of courts. Despite numerous achievements in satisfying 
EU legal requirements, problems still remain redefinition of SAA in the 
constitutional and legal system, including the possibility of direct ap-
plication of its provisions by Croatian courts; poor definition of the le-
gal standing of bodies like the Stability and Association Council, and 
particularly the poor definition and legal standing of decisions made by 
these bodies. The possibility of changing the constitution in connection 
with EU membership is still not on the agenda. Substantial changes in 
legal culture are needed because the constitutional court and the par-
liament still follow the authoritarian concept of unitary authority. This 
means that we need an interpretative change of course towards the val-
ues of pluralistic democracy. 
There have been few fundamental changes in social policy al-
though a number of important initiatives, projects and studies appear 
likely to have a longer-term impact. The preparation of the Joint Inclu-
sion Memorandum has increased the visibility and role of the EU in so-
cial policy in Croatia. The process has involved stakeholder dialogue 
but has drawn attention to the weakness of such a dialogue and has so 
far not facilitated inter-ministry or inter-agency cooperation as much 
as might have been hoped. It has also shown the urgent need for the 
development of comparable statistical bases. The EU has introduced a 
benchmark before the relevant chapter on employment and social poli-
cy can be formally opened for negotiations. Once again it indicates the 
need for an action plan to address the strengthening of administrative 
capacity. Besides the EU, important players in the social policy field in 
Croatia still are the World Bank and UNDP. That points to the necessi-
ty of a stronger role for relevant domestic players in development of the 
knowledge base and in setting social policy options. 
Civil society complains that although some strategies (e.g. re-
lated to development of civil society or communication with and infor-
mation of the public about the EU) do exist, enforcement is question-
able, government is yet not ready for the dialogue, a national forum on 
accession functions is mostly on paper and inclusion of civil society 
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organizations representatives in negotiations is quite weak. The tight 
time-framework for negotiations explains the hesitations or unwilling-
ness of government to include more civil society representatives, but 
the poor capacity of civil society organizations could also be a reason. 
Civil society faces a particular problem as Croatia is the only country 
with which the EU did not form a joint consultative committee to co-
operate with the European Economic and Social Committee. The Croa-
tian SAA simply lacks such a provision, which points again to our own 
incompetent approach in negotiations, for all other European Agree-
ments do contain such provisions. Whatever the reason for poor partic-
ipation of civil society in EU related activities, civil society should not 
expect the government to do its job, but should if capable, engage on 
its own and claim the information, the communication and participa-
tion possibilities. 
THE CHALLENGES OF PARTICIPATION
The following part of the chapter will try to summarize the most 
important findings of the 2006 project on monitoring the Croatian ac-
cession to the EU. 
Negotiations, communication and lobbying
Missing the 2004 enlargement process, Croatia is today in a po-
sition to learn the lessons of that accession: not only how to negotiate 
but also how to implement necessary reforms in the best possible way. 
Success in these endeavours will depend on communication of negotia-
tions and involvement of stakeholders, not only because these concepts 
are trendy, but because they are important for obtaining better results. 
The chapters in this group re-examine the issues still questionable even 
within the EU: communication of the EU as still a developing category, 
lobbying as a controversial concept, rather undeveloped in Croatia and 
EU citizenship as one of the least elaborated and concrete EU terms. 
We could ask ourselves: Who are the citizens to whom the EU is com-
municated? Do they exist? Are they the citizens of the EU or the citi-
zens of member states? Who is joining, communicating and lobbying? 
Tomislav Maršić writes about the conflicts of integration speed, 
democratic control and stakeholder participation in negotiations, look-
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ing for trade-offs among these contradictory goals. The Croatian nego-
tiations are streamlined in order to be completed in record time. They 
concentrate one-dimensionally on executive expertise, reinforcing 
problems in domestic representation and legitimisation and failing to 
accommodate to new strategic developments like enlargement fatigue 
in the EU and eurofatigue in Croatia. Strategic changes in the domestic 
negotiation set up should be made in order to ensure better representa-
tion by the parliament and a less pressured approach to accession. 
In contrast to the last enlargement the end of negotiations will 
depend more on the implementation and less on mere adoption of the 
EU requirements. Croatia will have to work more thoroughly and the 
EU will have wider leeway in rating the progress. Accession negotia-
tions are asymmetric because of the overwhelming negotiating pow-
er of the EU, but also because of the weaknesses of candidate coun-
tries, and that is the fact a candidate should have in mind all the time. 
The foreseen timetable might depend on a tacit preference for ignoring 
the widespread euroscepticism within the country and the enlargement 
fatigue within the EU. Public concerns should be taken very seriously, 
considering the option of an accession treaty being rejected by the pop-
ulation. Yet the government seems to be pushing through negotiations 
as fast as possible. The lessons of the rejection of the EU Constitution 
should illustrate the danger of political elites ignoring adequate elector-
ate representation and failing to generate the legitimacy necessary to 
engage in large scale reforms. 
Focus on quick accession at any cost rests on the presumption 
that a slower tempo would endanger the transition process. On the con-
trary, small states lacking the capacity to meet the tight timetable and 
to draft qualitative reforms could especially risk poor quality of legis-
lation and insufficient policy analysis, government overload and coun-
terproductive results. The persisting need for speed collides with the 
goals of fostering democracy. The low degree of responsibility vested 
in parliamentary representatives in the negotiations will lead to temp-
tations to abuse negotiation issues by politicisation instead of problem-
focused discussion. The author therefore recommends turning from an 
“as soon as possible” to an “as soon as ready” policy. The present situa-
tion seems to overstrain both the citizens of Croatia and the EU. 
It is not EU membership itself, but intense reforms enabled by 
the window of opportunity that should be used as a self-disciplining in-
strument. Shortening this period means less time available for design-
ing, sequencing and implementing reforms in a socially bearable way. 
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It is also necessary to turn away from a top-down to a more bottom-up 
approach, as legitimacy requires substantive rather than symbolic con-
trol of citizens over political processes and their contents. EU issues 
should be looked upon as domestic issues, since the decisions made in 
Brussels will sometime override those made in Zagreb, which should 
become clear to the Croatian parliament. The government should also 
reconsider the necessity of its “tight grip” and work to render negotia-
tions management more transparent and flexible improving conditions 
for negotiations at home and lessening rigid control of the process of 
coordination. 
Petra Leppee Fraize looks at how the EU, its member states, 
candidate countries and Croatia communicate European issues to their 
publics, emphasizing that Europeanisation of communication should 
be taken into consideration as a way of filling the communication and 
democratic deficits and of rectifying the lack of the legitimacy of the 
EU. Communication should focus not only on teaching facts but also 
on raising popular interest, as an instrument for ensuring the future 
ability to justify and win support for the integration project. Europe-
an integration was for a long time considered a project of the Europe-
an political elite, while citizens showed little interest and were not in-
volved in enlargements, treaties or policies. Consequently people feel 
remote from the EU and national institutions and the decision-making 
process. Despite a rather long process of integration, EU communica-
tion policy remains a young policy that has yet to be developed. EU 
communication in Croatia could be looked upon as a tool to acquire 
support for the final decision on accession but also for better grasp of 
the advantages of the EU and ways of coping with its disadvantages. 
Political elites in Croatia should be aware of public opinion and try to 
communicate better the rights and obligations stemming from member-
ship and the effect of the eventual accession on economic development, 
everyday life and internal policies and sovereignty. The low support for 
the integration, both within the EU and in Croatia shows that the com-
munication should be content-oriented and foster public debates. Cit-
izens should be more active in looking for information and checking 
the performance of their national and EU governments. The EU should 
take a realistic approach in creating a common sphere for communicat-
ing Europe based on more decentralised modes suited to specific polit-
ical contexts and to the diverse requirements of countries, regions and 
sectors. The success of communication will depend on the level of de-
centralisation and on bottom-up approaches. Whether it will in the end 
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result in greater or lesser support for the EU will depend on the EU re-
sults in delivering prosperity (economic growth), solidarity (social di-
mension, employment, ageing population) and security.
The EU is becoming involved in an increasing number of policy 
areas and citizens are more and more looking for channels of influence 
on its policies. Igor Vidačak explores the potential of the EU acces-
sion process for Europeanisation of domestic public policy shaping, the 
adoption of new and modern patterns of interest articulation, provid-
ing incentives for introduction of an adequate regulatory framework for 
lobbying and for legitimising the practice in Croatia. Europeanisation 
might bring not only new knowledge, autonomous sources of EU infor-
mation and new ways of thinking, but also a reorganisation and redefi-
nition of the role of interest groups in national policy processes, chang-
ing perception on good governance and good models of interaction be-
tween organised interests and the state. Interest representation and lob-
bying at EU level may prove to be a very important factor in the Euro-
peanisation of the structures, processes and contents of political deci-
sion-making in Croatia and of accepting lobbying as a legitimate dem-
ocratic practice. 
Snježana Vasiljević claims that European citizenship needs to 
be understood as a developing concept that is consequently for Croa-
tia a moving target. She explains the concept and the paradox of Eu-
ropean citizenship, its implications on fundamental rights and particu-
lar problems for third country nationals. To this day no elaborate the-
ory of European citizenship exists, its nature is limited and it could be 
looked upon as citizenship as nationality or citizenship as practice. De-
spite the influences of globalisation and multiculturalism it is still de-
pendant on national approaches towards citizenship. The EU still seems 
more interested in regulating aspects related to free movement of per-
sons (i.e. workers) than in encouraging social cohesion and placing hu-
man rights and anti-discrimination at the centre. For that to happen, the 
author suggests recognizing European citizenship to nationals of non-
EU countries legally living in the EU. But, first of all the EU should 
clarify European citizenship, what it is and what it could be. Although 
not a member, Croatia is thanks to its close and rapidly increasing con-
nections with the EU, one of the countries in which the developments 
of the European citizenship model should be closely observed. The do-
mestic understanding of and involvement in that topic could affect the 
necessary significant legal and political changes and also the success of 
negotiations. 
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Dealing with euroscepticism
As Croatian political elites have already opted for accession it 
would be pointless now to discuss whether we should or should not pro-
ceed. Croatia is already on the accession path so it should be used for 
promoting the best of the EU values and a better understanding of EU 
shortcomings. Improvement of information and communication should 
contribute to trust-building, both in national and EU institutions, but 
also to the re-questioning of EU institutions, their regulating powers, 
decision-making and requirements posed to national institutions. Key 
words are again information and communication. A reasonable reader 
must pose a question: What if thanks to better information and commu-
nication citizens form even worse views of both national and EU insti-
tutions? What if such views contribute to more scepticism and de-alien-
ation of the citizen? This is why predictions of citizen opinion are very 
important. Political elites should be aware of the attitudes of the popu-
lation, for after all the work done it might happen that after the EU says 
“yes”, the Croatian population says “no”. That could be a serious up-
set for the political elite, although it does not have to be disaster for a 
country. If acceptance by the EU meant that Croatia had transformed it-
self into a “by the book” society, the country would in that case reap the 
benefits of reforms even without joining the EU. 
Aleksandar Štulhofer deals with the characteristics of popular 
euroscepticism in Croatia, defined as a combination of distrust in the 
EU and distaste for membership by the members of public, not by the 
political elites. While distrust in the EU is relatively stable, averaging 
54% during 1995-2005, unwillingness to join the EU was until the end 
of 2003 below 20%, during 2004 it grew to about 40%, and since 2005 
the number of those who are opposed is more or less the same as the 
number of those who are for joining the EU. Motives of euroscepticism 
seem to be heterogeneous like exclusive nationalism and its sociocul-
tural, political and economic premises, while the impact of utilitarian 
motives turned out to be marginal. The lack of trust in the EU partial-
ly reflects distrust in national institutions. The usually stated reasons 
range from bruised national pride (relations with the ICTY), economic 
fears (the rise in the price of real estate, the import of cheaper agricul-
tural products, the obliteration of indigenous products), to loss of trust 
in the EU after the problems with the EU Constitution. The author did 
not find any clear socio-demographic profile for eurosceptics in Croa-
tia. The older and less-educated are more negatively inclined towards 
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joining, but the effect of both variables is weak. In the case of trust 
in the EU none of the demographic and socioeconomic indicators has 
proved significant. Popular euroscepticism is determined neither by hu-
man capital nor by personal success or lack of it during the transition. 
Irrespective of the relatively fluid structure of euroscepticism, symbol-
ic reasons like exclusive nationalism play an important role. The cor-
relation between trust in national institutions and trust in the EU con-
firms the proposition that citizens make their assessment on the basis of 
their experience with local or national institutions. It might be the con-
sequence of the lack of information about EU institutions, but in coun-
tries with low levels of participation and with little or no belief that cit-
izens can have any influence on the making of political decisions it 
might be a justification for apathy and opting-out. The author recom-
mends better provision of information, increasing trust in national insti-
tutions and creating a counterbalance to exclusive nationalism. Citizen 
trust in national institutions is strongly correlated with the perception 
of corruption among civil servants. This means that government should 
promote increased professionalism, effectiveness and transparency, 
identifying responsibilities and entailing sanctions against those who 
break the laws. Counterbalancing exclusive nationalism and strength-
ening rational attitudes toward the EU is dependent on success in creat-
ing conditions for utilitarian assessment. That means regularly repeated 
recommendations to the government: implementation of structural re-
forms aimed at increasing competitiveness of the economy, restructur-
ing social services and improving local and national governance. 
Dragan Bagić and Ante Šalinović conclude that on the basis of a 
utilitarian explanation of support it is possible only relatively poorly to 
predict viewpoints concerning joining the EU. Principled expectations 
of benefits and costs are in good part an expression of general impres-
sions about the EU, (dis)trust in the political elite and political views of 
citizens, and to a lesser extent realistic rational calculations of harms 
and benefits. One could discuss whether distrust in national institutions 
might have led those in favour of the accession to expectations that EU 
institutions might perform their functions in better way than national 
and that hope was channelled towards the EU? Or has the (dis)trust in 
national influenced (dis)trust in EU institutions? Whatever the reason 
for EU euphoria at the beginning and EU scepticism lately, the govern-
ing elite should learn the lesson. Views are formed at a relatively super-
ficial level without any great amount of information and more accord-
ing to impulse than as the outcome of rational evaluation. This might 
be the result of the low number and low quality of public debates about 
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the consequences and significance of entry into the EU. The value and 
political connotations of such a huge social decision should be formed 
in the process of public debate, but it seems that here we are more in ar-
rears than we are with respect to knowledge of facts about the EU. Un-
fortunately, it also seems that too much emphasis is placed on historical 
rather than economic aspects. The authors mention the very important 
perceptions of the attitude of the EU towards Croatia – treatment of the 
war, war-crimes, cooperation with the ICTY, relations with other coun-
tries of former Yugoslavia – that influence the views of Croatian citi-
zens towards the EU. The popular decision about the accession, much 
more than a cold and rational decision based on analyzing losses and 
gains, should be seen as a very complex social and political phenome-
non through which various aspects of the social, political and economic 
reality are refracted. 
Ljiljana Kaliterna Lipovčan and Zvjezdana Prizmić-Larsen 
compare quality of life, life satisfaction and happiness in Croatia and 
in European countries. Analyses show that Croatian citizen subjec-
tive well-being rates fit at the bottom of the EU-15 or at the top of the 
EU-13. Happiness ratings in Croatia are rather high and constantly going 
up. Satisfaction with personal life domains shows that the standard of 
living is the least satisfying, while relationships with family and friends 
were the most satisfying. Among national domains citizens are the most 
satisfied with national security and the environment and the least satis-
fied with social conditions in the country. As it is considered that happi-
ness is correlated with the progress in transition, the fact that happiness 
in Croatia is higher than in most of the transition countries seems both 
intriguing and encouraging. Well-being and happiness indicators might 
also help in evaluating attitudes towards the national and EU institu-
tions, particularly if we have in mind the “delivery factor” of the EU as 
the influential one for the euroscepticism. Dissatisfaction with standard 
of living and with social conditions, irrespective of how factually based 
they are, might indicate that utilitarian factors will become more impor-
tant in forming the views towards the EU in the course of time. 
Confronting the difﬁculties of the Lisbon  
agenda, state aid and health care reforms
The problems posed by the Lisbon agenda, state aid and health 
care reforms are tough even for the most developed countries. As these 
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problems are even more pronounced in Croatia, any improvement along 
the suggested lines would mean a move in the right direction. Lisbon 
goals are difficult to achieve, but they could be used as directions about 
where to go and how to learn from the best performers. 
Ana-Maria Boromisa and Višnja Samardžija claim that since the 
timeframe for implementation of the Lisbon agenda and Croatia’s ex-
pected accession are almost the same, approaching the Lisbon goals is 
extremely important for the country. Although they do not constitute 
additional criteria or economic goals, Lisbon objectives are relevant as 
they will soon be reflected in EU policies and they should be taken into 
account in our reform programs and action plans. It is necessary to pri-
oritize and sequence these goals bearing in mind the specific situation, 
starting position and real possibilities of implementation. The agenda 
aims to sustain economic growth with more and better jobs and great-
er social cohesion to respond to global competition with better policies, 
modernisation of the social model, environmental protection and boost-
ing research and innovation. 
The Lisbon goals should also be the goals of Croatia, but the 
threats faced by Lisbon are also the threats faced by Croatia. The au-
thors single out the disappointing delivery of Lisbon due to goals de-
fined too widely, overloaded agenda, poor coordination and conflict-
ing priorities. Weaknesses are particularly evident in labour markets, 
showing up as poor creation of jobs, regional imbalances, long-term 
unemployment and unfavourable demographic trends. Key challenges 
include increasing employment and labour market performance, sus-
tainability and quality of public finances, improving research, develop-
ment and innovation, strengthening business environment and increas-
ing skills. 
Croatia should have in mind that it will be required to align with 
more acquis than countries that joined previously, that would-be mem-
bers have to comply more strictly than members and that sequencing 
will be particularly important, especially when the time horizon for full 
membership is not known. Although Croatia introduced some of the 
Lisbon aims and objectives into various strategic documents (regard-
ing science, research, knowledge society, competitiveness, social cohe-
sion and welfare), implementation instruments are missing. There is an 
urgent need to develop action plans and other implementation instru-
ments with clear obligations, deadlines and reporting system. It is par-
ticularly important to develop the system of collecting and monitoring 
qualitative and quantitative indicators, following EUROSTAT indica-
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tors that would enable comparisons with member countries and other 
candidates. Accelerating the process of privatization and restructuring 
of state and local public enterprises plus improvements in education 
would also mean steps in the right direction. 
Ivana Jović and Marina Kesner-Škreb claim that state aid de-
viates sharply from that in the EU and that Croatia will have to make 
great efforts to harmonize it. The EU advocates less and better-target-
ed state aid, which has the least distorting effect on competition, i.e. 
horizontal aid which helps establishing a level playing field for all un-
dertakings. The state-aid-to-GDP ratio is four times higher in Croatia 
than in the EU, with the aid being mainly targeted on particular indus-
tries. Croatia will have to reform thoroughly or reduce its sectoral aid 
to the shipbuilding, transport (especially railways) and steel industries, 
as well as aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulties. It will 
also have to increase aid to horizontal objectives, improve significantly 
the transparency of state aid allocation and avoid ad hoc authorizations 
of aid to rescue certain enterprises. The Government is committed to 
reducing state subsidies, but greater efforts will be needed first of all in 
implementing short-term measures to improve transparency, strength-
ening the administrative capacity of the relevant agency and most im-
portantly the restructuring and privatization of the economy. The ship-
building and steel sectors are the burning issues, requiring prompt mea-
sures. One should again emphasize problems of administrative capaci-
ty building, privatization of the economy and decreasing the role of the 
state in the economy.
Problems facing health care in Croatia according to Dubravko 
Mihaljek are not new or unique. A key factor for the success of health 
care reform will be the authorities’ ability to manage the political econ-
omy aspects of the reform. But the technical complexity of health care 
policy and reform should not be underestimated either. Unfortunately 
Croatia lacks health care experts capable of making a much more sub-
stantive contribution to the reform than has been the case so far and 
it also lacks the management skills in the health sector to implement 
the reform. The present model of health care financing will have to be 
changed in the direction that a significantly greater portion of fund-
ing should come from general tax revenue from central and local bud-
gets than from the payroll contributions. Social benefits and costs of 
the current system of sick and maternity leave allowances should be re-
examined and simplified administrative procedures for part-time work 
introduced. To ensure more effective use of public funds, the introduc-
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tion of more competition into health care markets is needed. Public fi-
nancing does not have to mean a public provision of health care and 
as in many other countries the health care sector could function as a 
mixture of public and private providers. For that to happen authorities 
have to elaborate a consistent framework for private sector involve-
ment in health care. Also a consistent institutional, regulatory and mar-
ket framework in which private health insurance companies are expect-
ed to function and incentives for their developments should be elabo-
rated. Having people participate in bearing the costs of health care is 
the first step toward a true health care reform. Briefly, health sector is 
confronted with problems similar to other sectors – the need for priva-
tization, administrative and managerial capabilities, institutional setting 
building for new procedures and selling reforms to population.
The environment: challenges and possibilities
Environment poses challenges of coping with demanding and 
expensive EU requirements that are at the same time essential for the 
future of the country. In the same time the field offers possibilities for 
Croatia, a country with a long Adriatic Sea coastline connecting a num-
ber of countries, to achieve a position as leader in the area of sea pro-
tection and induce activities on regional and international levels. In 
both aspects institutional and administrative capacities will be crucial – 
from decision making to the final implementation, from strategic think-
ing to costly, competent, long-time work in numerous aspects of com-
prehensive environmental field that covers almost all aspects of citi-
zen life. 
Ivana Vlašić and Mirna Vlašić Feketija claim that transposition 
of the acquis, ensuring its adequate implementation and absorbing the 
pre-accession funds constitute an enormous task particularly for a small 
country. The lack of financing strategies and carefully planned timeta-
bles for implementation of the obligations sends a clear message that 
decisions should be made and actions taken immediately. While Vlašić 
and Vlašić Feketija are worried about the state of the environment Ka-
literna-Lipovčan and Prizmić-Larsen state that citizens were the most 
satisfied with national security and the state of environment. While sat-
isfaction with national security might be understandable for a post-war 
country, the high satisfaction with the state of the environment might 
be the result of unawareness of the real state and problems not only in 
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the country but also on the global scale. Despite the existing strategies 
and plans, Croatia still lacks applicable documents, specific steps to the 
fulfilment of what has been envisaged, efficient monitoring and guid-
ance on the management of the possible financial sources. A particu-
lar problem is the lack of a well-trained and experienced administration 
to cope with time-consuming tasks, stringent and rigid EU procedures. 
EU offers various possibilities of funding, the majority of which will go 
into water protection and waste disposal. These possibilities should be 
seen as instruments to improve the environment and to endorse specific 
economic activities that could be considered a comparative advantage 
for the country. The overall administrative capacity at national, region-
al and local levels will determine the level of the absorption of avail-
able EU funds. Appropriate staffing policy will be a key to successful 
institutional-capacity strengthening, which requires a careful develop-
ment of long term-plans to recruit and train staff. Additional dedication 
of the decision-making level in the administration to set the priorities 
as well to the operational level to successfully manage the programmes 
is needed. At decision-maker level, resolution is required in setting pri-
orities, while at implementation level the same resolution must be ap-
plied to the successful management of the necessary programmes. It all 
revolves around the insufficient administrative capacities and scarce fi-
nancial resources. As in all other fields, administrative-capacities build-
ing seems a more serious problem than financial scarcity. 
Davor Vidas discusses the need for the designation of the Adri-
atic Sea as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) and the Croatian 
initiative towards regional cooperation in that direction.ii The rationale 
for this inheres in the special features of the Adriatic Sea while the pol-
icy context was set by the trends within the EU and by the evolving EU 
Marine Strategy. The PSSA status could provide a significant regional 
cooperative framework, in line with EU policy and highlight the aware-
ness of the vulnerability of the Adriatic Sea. Although that sea connects 
six countries the lengths of their coasts vary, from Croatia stretching 
over 75% to Slovenia only 0.5% of that coast. The Italian share of the 
coast is only 15%, but it annually receives 75% of the total commercial 
ship traffic and 80% of cargo. Italy accordingly accounts for over 75% 
of ballast water introduction in the Adriatic ports. Although all Adriatic 
countries certainly should be interested in protection of their own and 
the common sea, the above figures speak enough about the particular 
need of Croatia to strive for achieving the best possible protective mea-
sures. It is particularly important because of the reliance on and orien-
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tation towards tourism, fishing, agriculture and preserving life on nu-
merous islands already facing depopulation. Numerous ideas and plans 
worked out together with some of the Adriatic countries already ex-
ist, but Croatia should take a step further with a concrete proposal for 
designating the Adriatic Sea a PSSA. Croatian and Norwegian institu-
tions already work on a cooperative project and if everything goes as 
planned a joint Adriatic PSSA proposal might work out in 2007. This 
example shows that even without membership status, Croatia could 
navigate through EU possibilities. EU Marine Strategy Directive is di-
rectly applicable only to the EU members and waters covered by their 
sovereignty or jurisdictions, but member states are required within each 
marine region or sub-region to make every effort to coordinate their ac-
tions with third countries. In this case two members, one candidate and 
three aspirants might benefit from that requirement and Croatia might 
make a position for itself as a competent regional player. Of course, 
it all just might happen, but only with determination, competency and 
hard work of Croatian government. 
CONCLUSIONS
It is not difficult to imagine the main EU principles such as lib-
erty, democracy and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms 
and the rule of law, as well as fundamental social rights and values like 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men as objectives for Croatia. These values at 
least on paper are recognized by all societies, but it does not harm to 
repeat them as often as possible. In that sense the EU should be a role 
model for Croatia. The increasingly frequently recognized motto of the 
EU “Unity in Diversity” could also be appealing both for joining the 
EU and for its application within the country. Of course the threats of 
the EU because of its bureaucratization and overregulation should also 
not be overlooked. 
Fulfilment of Copenhagen political, economic and legal-insti-
tutional criteria, at least to the level that would satisfy the EU, would 
mean that Croatia had reached the goals of a modern, capable and open 
society, irrespective of the potential EU capability to absorb the 28th 
member. As there exists a kind of consensus that in a long run the EU 
has achieved more in the economic than in the political sense, as long 
as the EU delivers economic benefits it will be attractive for current 
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and would-be members and the economic stance will affect the stance 
towards further enlargements. It is of course questionable what “deliv-
ery” might mean for the EU as a whole and for its members. Any eco-
nomic slow-downs within the EU certainly would not be propitious for 
further enlargements. As the institutional structure of the EU has been 
envisaged for 27 members, Croatia – potentially the 28th member – fac-
es a particular problem often overlooked within the country. It seems 
that in Croatia more emphasis is often put on the decision of France that 
it will hold a referendum on any new accession after Bulgaria, Roma-
nia and Croatia. That fact might be comforting, but also the previous in-
stitutional constraint (although remediable) should not be overlooked. 
One should also have in mind various ideas like “modular integrations” 
or “part-memberships” that could also be envisaged even for Croatia, 
not only for countries like Belarus or Ukraine. Such inventive EU solu-
tions do not have to be perceived as a tragic outcome for Croatia. 
Implications of the findings of this work might be summarized 
in a following way:
•  Comparisons with other countries show different results from high 
rankings in measurements of well being and happiness perceptions to 
big differences in state aid as a proportion of GDP. The most impor-
tant problem encountered is lack of reliable data bases, which results 
in the necessity of collecting and monitoring qualitative and quantita-
tive indicators to enable reliable comparisons with other countries. 
•  The economic situation is burdened with the slowness of reforms and 
privatization, and high involvement of the state, resulting with high 
foreign and public debt, dilatory results in increasing employment 
and poor results in decreasing public expenditures. 
•  Irrespective of membership when particularly interested and capable, 
Croatia could try to give initiatives and use the opportunities avail-
able in the EU, as in the protection of Adriatic Sea.
•  Even without membership status, Croatian experts could contribute 
to the discussions of EU topics like communicating the EU or Euro-
pean citizenship models.
•  Popular views might become more important than the views of politi-
cal elites and they should be carefully observed. For that reason com-
munication, interest representation and citizen participation should 
be promoted and developed.
•  Capabilities of Croatian institutions are still the weakest spot. This 
means that administrative and managerial capacity building and im-
proving local and national governance will be crucial and even more 
important than the eventually insufficient financial sources.
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•  Croatia needs accelerated privatisation and restructuring of state and 
local public enterprises, decreasing state intervention in the economy, 
restructuring social services, deregulation of markets, particularly of 
services and more flexible and open labour markets, all aiming at in-
creasing competitiveness of the economy.
•  Improvements in education and training not necessarily heading to 
increased expenditures but reforms oriented towards enabling con-
ditions for the long-term modernization of curricula and diminishing 
the mismatch of labour force demand and supply will be crucial.
•  Key words mentioned as lacking in almost all chapters of the book 
are implementation, enforcement and action plans. 
•  Depoliticization and political determination, competency and will to 
undertake substantial reforms and changes will be crucial, particu-
larly in circumstances when political elites are dominant and citizens 
apathetic and alienated. This is necessarily connected to a capacity to 
develop a public administration capable of mastering new procedures 
and selling reforms to the citizens. Success will depend on leader-
ship that does not produce only plans, agendas and proclamations but 
visible results in the form of economic growth, a functioning market 
economy and the capacity to withstand competition on the one hand 
and a functioning administration that will protect and enhance the 
values of democracy and the rule of law on the other. 
Reforms are always painful and one could expect that for exam-
ple public sector employees who are extremely protected in comparison 
with the majority of those employed in the private sector will obstruct 
changes. They will think twice whether to support changes that might 
benefit the unemployed or young. The willingness of all citizens – trade 
unions, employers, pensioners or patients – who will besides their own 
interests have to have in mind the interests of their children and grand-
children, particularly those already looking for employment and those 
that will be joining this group in future, their ability to obtain loans and 
buy apartments, will be crucial. Of course, the courage of politicians to 
undertake the risk of losing at the next elections will be important too. 
Without liberalization, diminishing the role of the state in the econo-
my, changed role of the government, redirection of state aid from ver-
tical to horizontal purposes, better education, accepting modern tech-
nologies and entrepreneurship in a world characterized by globalization 
and liberalization of capital and labour markets, Croatia could encoun-
ter problems coping with more competitive countries. Briefly said, we 
need readiness of citizens to support changes and willingness of politi-
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cians to undertake the risk, plus a public administration capable of re-
forming first itself, then the whole public sector. Faster privatisation not 
only of big systems like the postal bank or oil industry, but also of nu-
merous state owned shares on all levels of government could accelerate 
the process. Real emphasis on an efficient judiciary, the fight against 
corruption and transparency of the public sector, briefly, a real depoliti-
cization of all aspects of the society, is needed. 
*  The author wishes to acknowledge comments and useful suggestions of peer review-
ers. Eventual errors are the sole responsibility of the author. 
i  This part of the text beneﬁted from inputs of colleagues who closely monitor their
ﬁelds of interest and expertise and I would like to thank them in alphabetical or-
der: Ana-Maria Boromisa, Mirta Kapural, Ines Kersan-Škabić, Danijela Kuliš, 
Dubravko Mihaljek, Siniša Rodin, Paul Stubbs, Igor Vidačak and Siniša Zrinšćak.
ii  As deﬁned by Vidas, PSSA is an area that needs special protection through action by
the International Maritime Organization because of its signiﬁcance for ecological,
socio-economic or scientiﬁc reasons, and because it may be vulnerable to damage
by international shipping activities. 
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